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RECENT CASES
AGENCY
ELECTION BETWEEN UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT
On a question of first impression in the federal courts,
a United States District Court has held that one suing both
an undisclosed principal and his agent need not elect which
defendant to pursue to judgment, at least until the court has
decided whether there was an agency relationship. Conducive to the result was an obvious dissatisfaction, with the
entire doctrine which ordinarily requires an election of defendants in the undisclosed principal situation.
Denunzio Fruit Co. brought a statutory 2 suit for breach
of contract in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of California, joining as defendants Crane, in whose
name the contract was made, and Kasanjian, the partially
disclosed principal of Crane. The court took under advisement a motion by both defendants at the close of the evidence
to compel Denunzio to elect which defendant it would
hold liable. In final disposition of the suit, the court dismissed the action against Kazanjian on the ground that Crane
had acted beyond his authority. Damages were awarded
against Crane. The district court further stated that there
was no error in refusing to compel Denunzio to elect at
the close of the evidence which of the defendants it would
hold liable. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F.
Supp. 117 (S. D. Calif. 1948).
1. ". . . certainly, in justice, no litigant should be denied the
fruits of a just judgment simply because, under the compulsion of the
court he was held to an election, and, either through inadvertence or
because of ignorance of the law, elected to hold the wrong party." '79
F. Supp. 117, 139 (S. D. Calif. 1948).
2. Action was brought before the War Food Administrator, Department of Agriculture, pursuant to Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, § 1 et seq., 46 STAT. 531 et seq. (1930), 7 U. S. C.
§ 499 a et seq. (1946). Respondent Crane appealed to the federal district court, as provided by Section 7 (b) of the Act, 46 STAT. 535 (1930),
7 U. S. C. § 499 3 (b) (1946), from a reparation order of the Secretary
of Agriculture affirming a prior award of the board in favor of complainant Denunzio. The action before the federal district court is a
trial de novo.

D49

I RECENT CASES

447

Federal courts, 3 although following 4 the general rule5
which allows a third party, T, to sue the party with whom he
contracted, A, or A's undisclosed principal, P, have at the
same time seemed to endorse the further rule which requires
that T elect which of the defendants he chooses to pursue. 6
But the district court's avowed hostility to the election rule
and its implicit declaration that it would if the question were
presented adopt a policy of not requiring election 7 typify the
present dubious state of the rule in federal courts. In the
absence of explicit guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,8 reexamination of the bases of the election rule
3. In a diversity case the question might well arise under the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), whether the election
rule is a "procedural" matter to be governed by federal rules or a
matter of "substance" in which state law would govern.
The statement in the Denumzio case that election is a procedural rule was unnecessary to the decision because federal jurisdiction was obtained on
the federal question ground.
See note 2 supra. For a discussion
of substance and procedure under Erie v. Tompkins, see Note, 24 IND.
L. J. 418 (1949).
4. E.g., Pitt. Terminal Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F.2d 387 (3rd Cir.
1934). The liability of either A or P exists where P is partially disclosed as well as where he is undisclosed. Dorsey v. Martin, 58 F.
Supp. 722 (E. D. Pa. 1945); Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed. 656 (7th Cir.
1904).
5. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 144, 186, 321, 322 (1933).
6. It has been held error to permit an action against P and A
to be prosecuted to judgment against both. The pleader should be put
to his election in limine. The Jungshoved, 290 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1923),
cert. denied 263 U. S. 707 (1923).
Commencement of a suit against
A, at least with an attachment, is an election and bars suit against P.
Barrell v. Newby 127 Fed. 656 (7th Cir. 1904).
The rendering of an
interlocutory decree against A is an election as a matter of law.
Johnson v. Garrigues, 30 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1929).
But election involves a choice, and a judgment against A has been held not to be an
election when T's suit against A had been in progress for two years
and knowledge of P came to T only a few days before judgment was
rendered but after there had been a verdict for T.
Pitt. Terminal
Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1934).
7. See note 1 supra. The court in the Denunzw case quoted Judge
A. Hand, dissenting in Johnson v. Garrigues, 30 F.2d 251, 254 (2d
Cir. 1929).
". . . I feel that the doctrine of election ought only to
apply to a case where there has been both judgment and satisfaction,
and that anything less than a complete satisfaction or an estoppel in
pais affords no logical basis for barring a remedy against both agent
and undisclosed principal . . ." See Ore Steamship Corp. v. Hassell,
137 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1943) (The harsh election rule rests on
nothing more than barren logic and in the absence of estoppel there
should be no election until a judgment is actually satisfied).
8. FED. R. Civ. P., 18 (a) allows a plaintiff in his complaint to
join as many claims, independent or alternate, as he may have against
an opposing party. FED. R. CIv. P., 20 (a) permits a plaintiff to join
in one action as defendants all persons against whom plaintiff has any
right to relief arising out of the same "transaction." Judgment may be
given against one or more defendants according to their respective
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may illuminate the question of what force it may have in the
future.
Justifications for the application of the election rule have
been as numerous as they have been unsatisfactory. It has
been said that the rule serves a good purpose;9 that it is
founded upon a policy which forbids T to trifle with the
courts ;1o that since T's action against P came as a windfall
he cannot object when it is suddenly lost;" that P might be
vexed with a double action; 12 that there might be two outstanding judgments with no way of showing that satisfaction
of one was satisfaction of the other. 13 Still other cases have
applied the election requirement on the theory that T has
only one remedy against A or P and once T asserts the contract to be A's, he may not later say it is P's, for he has already denied it. 14 Common to these "reasons" is their tacit
liabilities. While T obviously may join A and P under these rules,
their "respective liabilities" would seem to be governed by the federal
cases upholding the election rule. Thus A and P would not be jointly
liable. The Jungshoved, 290 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1923).
This would
seem to necessitate a dismissal against either A or P during the trial,
and a judgment taken thereafter against the remaining defendant, even
though it might remain unsatisfied, would be an election. Johnson
v. Garrigues, 30 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1929); Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed.
656 (7th Cir. 1904).
9. Georgi v. Texas Co. 225 N. Y. 410, 122 N. E. 238 (1919).
10. Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed. 656 (7th Cir. 1904).
11. Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504, 544 (1879).
In a
similar vein it is suggested that it would be contrary to justice to
allow T to sue A and also P when at the time the contract was made
there was no intention that he should do so. Kendall v. Hamilton,
supra at 514; Ewing v. Hayward, 50 Cal. App. 708, 717, 195 Pac. 970,
974 (1920).
But neither was it the intention of T that he should be
allowed to hold P at all.
12. If the action were brought and judgment rendered against the
agent, the agent would have a right of action for indemnity against
P. If P were also originally liable to suit, he would be vexed with a
double action. Sessions v. Block, 40 Mo. App. 569, 572 (1890).
13. Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504, 515 (1879).
14. Hatley Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 154 Miss. 846, 858, 123 So. 887, 890
(1929); Tuthill v. Wilson, 90 N. Y. 423 (1882); Fitzsimmons v. Baxter,
3 Daly 81, 84 (N. Y. 1869); Borrell v. Newell, 3 Daly 233, 235 (N. Y.
1870). Likewise, by prosecuting an action against P to judgment, T
denies that the agent was acting for P.
Murphy v. Hutchinson, 93
Miss. 643, 48 So. 178 (1908).
The cases tendering this "reason" for
the election requirement drew on the rationale of the English cases.
In England a judgment against A or P is said to merge with the one
contract and bars further action by T. Thus a judgment against A
before P is discovered destroys any right against P. E.g., Priestly v.
Fernie, 3 H. & C. 977, 159 Eng. Rep. 820 (Ex. 1863); Moore v. Flanagan, [1920] K. B. 919, 926. American cases, however, have uniformly
held that a judgment against A before T acquires knowledge of P does
not bar further action against P. E.g., Pitt. Terminal Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1934); see also, Note, 119 A. L. R. 1324
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reliance upon a priori assumptions and upon apparent fondness for logical symmetry.15
If the problem is approached with the realization that
the election rule is the by-product of the more basic rule
which gives T a right to sue both A and P, the true considerations which should expose the utility and validity of the election requirement become apparent. For clearly the two rules
are working at cross purposes, one providing and the other
to some extent depriving T of satisfaction of his claim. 6
(1939).
The refusal of the American courts to apply the merger
doctrine seems to be a direct contradiction of the assumption that there
is only one contract which is either P's or A's.
15. The reasons given for requiring an election could conveniently
be disposed of by assuming from the beginning that a joint judgment
may be given against A and P. Arkansas, under an elastic system
of procedure, has allowed joint judgment. Williamson v. O'Dwyer, 127
Ark. 530, 192 S. W. 899 (1917).
16. The remedy given T on the contract against P was unique for
common law courts, especially in view of the fact that, "a fundamental
notion of the common law is that a contract creates strictly personal
obligations between the contracting parties." HuFFCOUT, AGENCY 158
(2d ed. 1901). However, the action on the contract was the most
desirable remedy from T's viewpoint. He was placed in a much better
position than if he had been given an action in deceit (often difficult
to prove), or an action for benefit conferred (under which recovery
would be denied where the contract was still executory).
Ames described the contract action against P as an anomaly, not to be encouraged. Ames, Undisclosed Principal-His Rights and Liabilities, 18
YALE L. J. 443 (1909). But it is unanimously agreed that T has such
an action. Hospelhorn v. Poe, 174 Md. 242, 198 Atl. 582 (1938); 2
MECHEM, AGENCY § 1731 (2d ed. 1914). If the practical consideration
which supports this right in T is that T should be allowed to realize
the economic advantage for which he has bargained, the election rule,
aside from bare legal logic, must be classified as no more than an
absurdity. If T elects to pursue an execution-proof party he is denied
the satisfaction which would have been his had he made a different
choice. Two well considered cases in the state courts have herd that
T may pursue A and P until satisfaction. Williamson v. O'Dwyer, 127
Ark. 530, 192 S. W. 899 (1917) (joint judgment allowed); Beymer v.
Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298 (1875) (judgment against A no bar to action
against P). New York, after years of indecision, dispensed with the
election rule by statute, N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 112-b (1939).
Much writing supports satisfaction. 2 MECHEM, AGENCY § 1751; STORY,
AGENCY § 295 (9th ed. 1882); Merrill, Election Between Agent and
Undisclosed Principal; Shall We Follow the Restatement? 12 NEB. L.
BULL. 100 (1934); Comment, 39 YALE L. J. 265, 270 (1929); Notes,
18 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 571 (1930); 22 ILL. L. REv. 181, 183 (1927); 24
MICH. L. REV. 298, 299 (1926); 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 957 (1930).
Contra: 3 TEx. L. REv. 384 (1925), accepting the doctrine of merger.
Perhaps, if in the facts of a particular case there is no good reason
for allowing an action against both A and P, it may be said that the
election rule works no hardship on T. See Blackburn, J., in Armstrong
v. Stokes, L. R. 7 Q. B. 598, 610 (1872) (It might have been a mistake
to allow T to have recourse at all against one to whom he never gave
credit; perhaps illogical exceptions have been established to cure the
fallacy of the rule allowing an action against P.)
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The key to the validity of the election rule then is the
desirability and business utility 7 of its progenitor, the rule

allowing T's bifurcated right of action against P and A.

If

for sufficient reasons it is useful to give T such an advantage then it may confidently be said to be unwise to whittle
away the advantage through meaningless legalisms. Agency
law should be flexible enough to keep step with changing
business practices. Considerations which guided the development of the law of undisclosed principal in the 19th century
should not necessarily control today.- 8 Examination of modern business methods as opposed to those of the 19th century, 19 of the needs and expectations of contracting parties
agency presupposes a commercial community.
10. It is concerned with everyday business relations and should be realistic in reflecting the underlying social factors
17. The

MECHEM,

law

AGENCY

as society changes.

of
§

STEFFEN, CASES ON AGENCY

1-12 (1933); Llewellyn,

Much of the law of agency
Agency, 1 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 483 (1930).
grew out of the introduction of some of the more advanced ideas of the

Chancellor concerning the law merchant.
ENGLISH LAW 297 (1924).

5

HOLDSWORTH'S

HIST.

OF

18. But the approach of the 19th century courts is to be commended. With the exception of the election rule the early English
cases concerning the liability of an agent and his undisclosed or
partially disclosed principal were not arbitrarily decided, but were the
result of thinking about the intentions of the parties and the customs
of the trade. See Addison v. Gandassequi, 4 Taunt, 574, 580, 128
Eng. Rep. 454, 457 (C. P. 1812); Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. D. 102,
The legal effect of the cases was that A was liable on
107 (1879).
the contract because he personally bound himself, Jones v. Littledale,
6 A. & E. 486, 490, 112 Eng. Rep. 186, 188 (K. B. 1837), and P was
liable because the purchase was made for him by his agent, Waring v.
But at least
Favenck, 1 Camp. 85, 170 Eng. Rep. 886 (N. P. 1807).
one early case recognized that the liability of P should depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and P should not be made liable where to do
so would be unfair. See cases cited in note to Addison v. Gandassequi,
4 Taunt. 574, 128 Eng. Rep. 454 (C. P. 1812). However, where there
was possible unfairness to both T and P it was difficult to say which
the court would prefer and the cases reached opposite results. It was
said that if the state of accounts between P and A had been altered
to P's prejudice, P might not be held. Thomas v. Davenport, 9 B. & C.
But a later case favoring T's
78, 109 Eng. Rep. 30, (K. B. 1829).
interest said P could be relieved of his liability only if payment to A
by P had been induced in reliance on T's representations. Herald v.
Kenworthy, 10 Exch. 739, 156 Eng. Rep. 638 (1855). But the election
rule operated independently of considerations of fairness to the parties;
where election was the question the sole consideration was the intention
of T to look to either A or P to the exclusion of the other. Curtis v.
The reasons for election were
Williamson, L. R. 10, Q. B. 57 (1874).
not satisfactorily explained. WHARTON, AGENCY § 471 (1876).
19. Even the rapid changes of the 19th century scarcely compare
with the business innovations of the 20th. Corporations today are
responsible for 92% of manufacturing output, and the widespread
influence of trade associations today creates an economic superstructure
far removed from the system of the Manchester School. LYNCH, THE
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER 101 et seq. (TNEC 1946).
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in an era when nearly all business is carried on through
natural or corporate agents-these are the factors which
should determine the future of the election rule. For
these are the factors upon which depends the real problem:
Of what contemporary utility is the entire law of undisclosed principal? Failure of the courts to consider2 0 these

governing factors accounts for the vacuous unrealism which
distinguishes the twentieth century case law in this area.

DUE PROCESS
BROAD SCOPE OF STATE REGULATORY
POWER REAFFIRMED

The Family Security Life Insurance Company, a corporation, was promoted by South Carolina funeral directors. Most
of its stockholders and agents were either owners or employees of mortuaries.'
The company had qualified to do
business and its agents had been duly licensed under the
provisions of a very comprehensive and stringent state in20. Even the reporters of the Restatement of Agency failed to approach the election rule realistically. As to the undisclosed principal
situation they followed what they perceived to be the weight of authority and adopted the election requirement. But the reporters voiced
their dissatisfaction with the rule. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, EXPLANATORY NoTEs § 435 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929). At least in the partially
disclosed principal situation they did not advocate the application of
the election requirement. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 184, 210, 336,
337 (1933). They should have felt no compulsion to follow such cases
as Georgi v. Thomas Co., 225 N. Y. 410, 122 N. E. 238 (1919) and
Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed. 656 (7th Cir. 1904), supporting the rule
because it "serves a good purpose" and is "founded upon a policy which
forbids T to trifle with the courts." The rule perhaps is not as
prevalent as the reporters thought it to be. Merrill, supra note 16.
For a discussion which puts aside such question-begging assumptions
as "alternate liability" and approaches the liability of A and P from
a standpoint of public policy, see Comment, 39 YALE L. J. 265 (1939),
which reaches the conclusion that T should be allowed to pursue A
and P until satisfaction, but that in the usual partially disclosed situation involving factors, brokers, etc., an early election should be required.
1. Plaintiff insurance company had 34 stockholders, all but one
of whom either owned, managed, or were employed by a mortuary. Of
the company's 79 agents, 51 were connected with undertaking establishments. Its president, and four of the five directors were owners or
managers of mortuaries. See Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel,
79 F. Supp. 62, 64 (E. D. S. C. 1948).

